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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 7, 2008, the Federal National Mortgage Association,
more commonly known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation, known as Freddie Mac, were placed into conservatorship,
marking one of the most drastic government interventions in the private
financial market in decades.' The two entities together had $5.4 trillion of
guaranteed, mortgage-backed securities ("MBS") and debt outstanding, and
their market share of all new mortgages reached over 80% earlier in 2008.2
The startling federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was followed
by the sale of Merrill Lynch to Bank of America, the Lehman Brothers
collapse, and an $85 billion federal loan to American International Group to
avoid bankruptcy.3 Most troubling, the week of October 6, 2008, was one of
the worst weeks for the stock market with the Standard and Poor's 500-stock
index and the Dow Jones industrial average each losing 18% of their value.4
*Juris Doctor Candidate 2010, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law.
1 Zachary A. Goldfarb, David Cho, & Binyamin Appelbaum, Treasury to Rescue
Fannie and Freddie; Regulators Seek to Keep Firms' Troubles From Setting Off
Wave of Bank Failures, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at Al. According to the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, "A conservatorship is the legal process in which
a person or entity is appointed to establish control and oversight of a Company to
put it in a sound and solvent condition. In a conservatorship, the powers of the
Company's directors, officers, and shareholders are transferred to the designated
Conservator." See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Questions andAnswers on
Conservatorship, available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/fhfa_consrv faqO90708hp I 128.pdf
(last visited May 12, 2009).
2 James B. Lockhart, Director, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, Press Conference. (Sept.
7, 2008).
3 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall
St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008; Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced &
Mary Williams Walsh, Fed in an $85 Billion Rescue of an Insurer Near Failure,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al.
4 Renae Merle, Worst Week Ever: Dow, S&P Each Fall 18%, WASH. POST, Oct.
11, 2008, at D1.
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Most economists believe the root of the current financial meltdown is
the subprime mortgage crisis.' The subprime mortgage crisis resulted from a
number of factors: the housing bubble, government and federal regulatory
policies, increased subprime lending and other risky mortgage products,
deceptive borrowers, and the fall of the housing market.6 Some blame the
lenders for making loans to high-risk borrowers, whom the lenders should
have known would not be able to pay the loans back, and naively assuming
that the housing market would continue to get better.7 Others point a finger at
the investment banks, which turned the subprime loans into low-risk
collateralized debt obligations ("CDOs"), superficially encouraging investors
to part with their money.8 Yet others place the blame on the subprime
borrowers themselves for borrowing money to buy houses they clearly could
not afford, sometimes doing so by lying about their income to receive the
loans.9 Other critics blame the Federal Reserve Board ("Fed") and Alan
Greenspan's policy of lowering interest rates after the dot-corn bubble crash,
stating that the Fed was misguided by erroneously low inflation data. 10 Most
likely, all of these elements, combined with the housing slump, led to the
subprime mortgage crisis." The details of the subprime mortgage crisis are
discussed in Part II of this note.
As of March 16, 2009, 172 subprime and credit crisis-related
securities suits have been filed, thirty of which were filed in 2009. 12 Many of
these lawsuits involve not only the lending companies, but also the directors
and officers of those companies. Although Directors and Officers Insurance
("D&O Insurance") will cover much of the personal liability that directors and
officers could be exposed to, there are many exceptions. These exceptions are
outlined in Part IV of this note. This note will explore the possibility of
personal liability for directors and officers of a company, despite the purchase
of D&O insurance.
5 The Economist, When Fortune Frowned, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2008,
available at
http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cftn?storyid=l 2373696.
6 Katalina M. Bianco, The Subprime Lending Crisis: Causes and Effects of the
Mortgage Meltdown, FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH), 2008.
7 Daniel W. Gerber, Joanna M. Roberto, and Carrie P. Appler, Coverage
Implications of the Subprime-Mortgage Meltdown, 1-2 MEALEY'S MORTGAGE
LENDING 23, Nov. 2007.81d.
9Id.
'0 Bianco, supra note 6, at 4-5.
"1 Matthew R. Wildermuth, Wildermuth on Subprime Mortgage Crisis and D&O
Insurance, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 112, Apr. 7, 2008.
12 The D&O Diary, http://www.dandodiary.com/ (Jan. 29, 2009).
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II. BACKGROUND
The housing bubble began after the dot-corn bubble crash in 2000 and
the subsequent recession that began in 2001. The Fed cut short-term interest
rates from 6.5 % to 1% in an effort to boost the economy. 13 This sharp decline
in the already historically low interest rate led to rapid increases in the
valuations of real property, causing a peak in 2005.14
In 2000 and again in 2005, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development forced Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase the target
percentage of mortgage financing directed towards borrowers with incomes
below the median in their area. 15 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac both met these
goals. Furthermore, in 2005, a change was made to the Community
Reinvestment Act, encouraging banks to lend to consumers who traditionally
would not qualify for loans in an effort to fulfill the American dream of home
ownership for all. 16
Private lenders and investment banks saw this as an opportunity and
embarked on a joint mission to make a profit. 17 During the 1970s, regulated,
traditional banks contributed 60% of the mortgage market. 18 However, the
rise of subprime lending has steadily decreased this number, to the point that
traditional lenders now hold only 10% of the market. 19 The share held by
13 Bianco, supra note 6, at 4.
14 Bianco, supra note 6, at 6; Many homeowners took advantage of the increased
valuations of their homes and refinanced with lower interest rates, taking out
second mortgages against the added value to use for consumer spending. Id.
15 Russell Roberts, How Government Stoked the Mania, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2008,
at A2 1.
16 Bianco, supra note 6, at 11; With the interest rate being so low, people who could
not afford homes prior were able to buy homes, which led to an increase in home
ownership in the United States from 64% in 1994 to an all-time high of 69.2% in
2004. See Id. at 11-12. Before year 2000, home buyers would pay a down payment on
a home and borrow the rest of the money from a single bank, which they would repay
until the loan was extinguished. See Bill Marsh, Housing Busts and Hedge Fund
Meltdowns: A Spectator's Guide, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2007/08/05/weekinreview/20070805_LOAN_G
RAPHIC.html. The borrowers would have to be credit worthy in order to obtain these
loans, and the loans are known as prime loans. However, since 2000, many of these
loans have been sold to investment banks, which transform the loans into mortgaged-
backed securities to sell to investors. Id. Although the buyers still repay the same
single bank, the risk attached to their mortgage is spread around and repackaged. The
type of mortgage that results is what is known as a subprime loan. Id.
17 Id
18 Bianco, supra note 6, at 7.
191d. Under banking regulations, subprime borrowers tend to be individuals who
have a FICO score of 660 or lower, have two or more 30-day delinquent payments
in the past year, a foreclosure or charge-off in the past 2 years, have declared
bankruptcy in the last 5 years, and have limited ability to cover monthly living
expenses. Melissa M. Ezarik, Are you a subprime borrower?, BANKRATE.COM,
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commercial banks has grown from virtually nothing to 40% of the entire
market, a disturbingly large increase.20
To cover the risk for making loans to high-risk borrowers, the lenders
often increased the interest rate on the loans.2' Other lenders and brokers
aggressively marketed adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs")-loans that had a
fixed interest rate for the first two to three years then "reset" and dramatically
increased.22 Because mortgage brokers do not lend their own money, there
was no direct correlation between loan performance and compensation for
them.23 In fact, mortgage brokers had more incentive to sell complex ARMs
24because they earned a higher commission. Lenders also offered reduced
documentation loans or "no doc" loans-a subset of Alt-A loans, which are
loans categorized between subprime and prime-in which the borrower did
not have to provide documentation to substantiate the income stated on the
application.25
The lenders would then sell the riskier mortgages to investment banks,
which would turn them into mortgage-backed securities, and the lenders would
use the money to make more subprime loans.26 The investment banks then
transformed the high-risk pieces of the loans into low-risk by taking the risky
pieces of multiple securities and creating a new security called a collateralized
debt obligation. A CDO has the same structure as a mortgage-backed security,
but a CDO has a superficially low risk rating. 27 Some critics of the subprime
mortgage crisis claim that conflicts of interest were involved with these ratings
because many rating agencies were being paid by the companies selling MBS
to investors, such as investment banks. 28 Because many investors do not fully
perform research on these bonds due to high cost and complexity of the
process, they only looked at risk ratings produced by ratings agencies.29
2008, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/debt/debtcreditguide/subprime-
trend 1 .asp. Although other lenders such as private mortgage bankers have different
definitions for subprime loan borrowers, this provides a general picture--one that
is less than ideal for a lender. Id.20Bianco, supra note 6, at 7.
21 Gerber, Roberto, & Appler, supra note 7, at 1-2.
22 Robert Jaworski, The Perfect Storm: Legal Issues Surrounding the Subprime
Mortgage Lending Crisis, LEXISNEXIS EXPERT COMMENTARIES (LexisNexis),
2008, at 1.
23 Bianco, supra note 6, at 8.
24 Id. A study has found that in 2004, mortgage brokers originated 68% of all
residential loans in the United States, with subprime and Alt-A accounting for over
42% of the 68%.
25 Id. at 7. Further incentive was created for the lenders with a decline in risk
premiums required to offer a subprime loan despite the decline in subprime
borrower and loan characteristics overall during 2001 to 2006. Id. at 6-7.
26 Marsh, supra note 15.
27 Id.
28 Bianco, supra note 6, at 9.
29 Id.
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By 2005, nearly one out of every four mortgages was subprime.3°
However, between 2004 and 2006, the Fed raised the interest rate a total of
seventeen times, increasing the 1% interest rate backup to 5.25%.31 Millions
of the existing loans with a two to three year adjustable rate began resetting to
higher interest rates, and many people began to default on their loans.32 Some
homeowners stopped paying their mortgages and walked away, allowing
foreclosure of their property.33 Lenders were also hurt by the increasing
number of foreclosures as legal fees, taxes due until the property was sold, and
lost equity in houses that had to be priced to sell in a falling market added
up. 34 A number of subprime mortgage lenders, including Ameriquest, New
Century Financial Corporation, and Fremont General either left the market,
became insolvent, or declared bankruptcy.35
By August 2006, there were slumping sales and prices in the housing
market, essentially leaving the housing sector in a "free fall."36 The added
inventory of unsold homes further weakened the local housing markets and
depressed the values of other nearby homes. 37 The sale of new homes fell in
February 2008 for the fourth straight month, pushing activity to a thirteen year
low.
38
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY FOR DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS
Of the many suits that have been filed as a result of the subprime
mortgage crisis, some have been filed by cities and state attorney generals
against lenders under a predatory lending theory, violation of the Consumer
Sales Practices Act, and public nuisance. 39  The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts succeeded in its suit against Fremont Investment and Loan
brought by the Attorney General alleging that the defendant lender committed
unfair and deceptive acts in originating and servicing certain subprime
mortgage loans.40 Although Fremont Investment and Loan appealed, the
lower court's decision was affirmed and the injunction, which restricted
30 Gerber, Roberto, & Appler, supra note 7.
31 Bianco, supra note 6, at 5.
32 Id. at 14-15.
33 1d. at 10.34Id. at 15.
35 Gerber, Roberto, & Appler, supra note 7.
36 Bianco, supra note 6, at 5.37 Id. at 15. At this point, the median price of new homes had dropped about 3%
since January of the same year. Id.38 1d. at 18.
39 Jay Miller, Ohio Chases the Predators, CRAIN'S CLEVELAND BUSINESS, June
2007; Complaint, City of Cleveland v. Deutsche Bank Trust Company, et. al., (CV
08 646970). The city of Cleveland alleges in its complaint that the epidemic of
foreclosures has devalued homes, depleted the city's tax base, and has therefore
created a public nuisance, causing the city to incur a vast amount in damages. Id.
40 Coin. v. Fremont Investment and Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 550-51 (Mass. 2008).
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Fremont's ability to foreclose on certain loans, was viewed in favor of the
public interest.41
However, most of the suits that have been filed are shareholder
derivative suits that concern violations of the Securities Act of 1933,
particularly section 11 and section 12(a)(2). 42 Others concern violations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), allegations of insider trading, breach
of the duty of care, breach of the duty to monitor, and breach of the duty of
loyalty. The shareholder derivative suits often involve not only the company,
but also the directors and officers of the corporations as defendants.
A. Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") requires a corporation to
file a registration statement with the Securities Exchange Commission
("SEC") and have it approved before it makes a public offering of stock to
shareholders.43 The registration statement includes a prospectus, which is
delivered to the securities market, and also to each investor who purchases
stock in the company.44
1. Section 11
Section 11 of the Securities Act gives a private cause of action when a
registration statement, prospectus, or other information required by section 7
of the Securities Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder "contains an
untrue statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to
be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading. 45 Section 11 imposes a "stringent standard of liability," and
liability arises only for statements that were false or misleading at the time the
-i 4 6
registration statement became effective.
A fact is considered to be material if a reasonable investor would
consider it to be significant in making an investment decision.47 Materiality
does not depend on the literal truth of the statements but rather on the ability of
4 Id. at 561.
42 Some examples include suits filed against Merrill Lynch & Co., Countrywide
Financial Corp., and Citigroup Inc.
43 WILLIAM A. KLEIN AND JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, 204 (8th ed., Foundation Press 2002)
(1980).
44id.
41 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2008).
46 id.
47 Thomas Lee Hazen, Remedies For Violation Of The Securities Act Of 1933 (And
Other Consequences Of Deficient Registration Statements, in 2 LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 7.3[1][A] (6th ed. Thomson Reuters, 2009).
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48
a reasonable investor to become accurately informed about the statement.
When assessing whether a fact is material, the courts consider the entirety of
the statements in question including information that is circulated through the
media, the efficiency of the market, and the extent to which the available
information is absorbed and reflected in the market price of the stock.4 9
Furthermore, materiality is determined as of the date of the offering, and not
by using hindsight that may be gained from subsequent events.5 °
A Section 11 claim can be brought against every person who signed
the registration statement, every person who was a director of the issuer at the
time the registration statement was filed, every person who prepared or
certified any report or valuation that was used in connection with the
registration statement, and every underwriter of the security in question.5'
Officers who are not also directors are only liable under Section 11 if they
signed the registration statement.
52
In order to enforce liability under Section 11, a plaintiff must have
purchased a security in reliance on the registration statement, and must prove
that the stock in question is traceable to the allegedly defective prospectus or
registration statement. 53 It is not sufficient to use statistical evidence to
48 Id.
49 Id.; In other words, the courts ask whether the defendants' representations or
omissions, considered together in context, would affect the total mix of information
available to the public and thereby mislead a reasonable investor. Halperin v.
ebanker Usa.com, Inc., 295 F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2002).50 Hazen, supra note 47.
5' 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2008).
52 William Meade Fletcher, Liability for false registration statements under Section
11, in 14 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 6850 (Thomson
Reuters/West, 2008).
53 Id. Actual reliance on the statement does not need to be proved, nor does the
plaintiff need to show any causal connection between the misrepresentation or
omission and the price decline of the security in question. Edward Brodsky and M.
Patricia Adamski, Reliance, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS:
RIGHTS, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES § 11:18 (Thomson Reuters/West, 2008). The
only exception that the showing of actual reliance is necessary that is uniformly
accepted by all courts is if the plaintiff
acquired the security after the issuer has made generally available
to its security holders an earnings statement covering a period of
at least 12 months beginning after the effective date of the
registration statement, then the right of recovery under this
subsection shall be conditioned on proof that such person
acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement in the
registration statement or relying upon the registration statement
and not knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be
established without proof of the reading of the registration
statement by such person.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2008). The Eleventh Circuit has also held that the
presumption of reliance is not available when the plaintiff had legally
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demonstrate a high probability that the plaintiff purchased securities that were
traceable to the securities offered under the registration statement.
5 4
Furthermore, the purchaser does not need to prove that he or she actually read
the registration statement in order to establish reliance.55 Because the plaintiff
must be the purchaser of the securities, an acquiring corporation in a merger
would not qualify as a Section 11 plaintiff.
56
Before filing a complaint, the plaintiff must make sure that the statute
of limitations has not run.57 A Section 11 claim must be brought within one
year of discovery or constructive knowledge of the misstatement or omission,
and no later than three years after the security was offered to the public. 58 A
plaintiff must allege that the claim is not time-barred by alleging: (1) the time
and circumstance of the discovery of the misstatement or omission, (2) the
reasons why it was not discovered earlier, and (3) the efforts taken by plaintiff
in making or seeking such discovery.59
When the plaintiff is ready to file a complaint, there is no uniformity
in the courts as to whether the heightened pleading requirement under Rule
9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply.60 The Second
Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have taken the approach that a Section 1 1 claim
is subject to a heightened pleading standard if the complaint is "sound in
fraud. ' '6' However, opponents believe that there is difficulty in applying this
standard in a Section 11 claim because it is not clear whether a claim is "sound
in fraud., 62 Because neither fraud nor scienter are elements of a Section 11
claim, a claim can be sufficiently plead without pleading fraud.63 In other
words, "while a heightened pleading requirement for fraud makes sense for a
statutory claim explicitly dependent on a showing of fraud, there can be no
comparable reason for upping the ante for a Section 11 claim which can be
committed to invest in the securities before the issuance of the registration
statement. APA Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Tech., Inc., 476 F.3d 1261,
1276 (11 th Cir. 2007).
54 Hazen, supra note 47, at § 7.3[5].
" Id., at § 7.3[4].
56 Fletcher, supra note 52.
57 John J. Clarke, Jr. and Lisa Firenze, Due Diligence and Potential Liabilities,
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES (2008).
8 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2008).
59 See Dorchester Investors v. Peak Int'l Ltd., 134 F. Supp. 2d 569, 578 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
60 Hazen, supra note 47, at § 7.3[7]. Rule 9(b) states:
"(b) Fraud or Mistake; Condition of Mind. In alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other
conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally." (emphasis
added). FED.R.CrV.P. 9(b).
61 Id..
62 id.
63 Id.
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based on negligence. ' 64 Regardless of whether it is procedurally efficient to
require a heightened pleading or not, plaintiff lawyers should be as particular
as possible when alleging a Section 11 claim.65
For instance, a class action suit was filed in California against New
Century Financial Corporation and its various officers, directors, underwriters,
and auditors for violating section 1 1 and section 12 of the Securities Act in
relation to the subprime mortgage crisis. 66 The defendants' various motions to
dismiss were granted because the plaintiffs' complaint failed to clearly identify
the allegedly false statements or "which of the factual allegations support an
inference that particular statements are false or misleading., 67 In order for a
plaintiff to defeat a defendant's motion to dismiss, the court recommended that
the plaintiff be "clear and concise in identifying false statements and
articulating the factual allegations supporting an inference that the statement is
false or misleading., 68 In addition, the court required the plaintiff to identify
facts supporting its allegations that a statement is false or misleading, and to
69place such supporting facts in the same paragraph or following the statement.
If a plaintiff is successful in pleading a Section 11 claim, there are
three methods for computing damages.7 ° Under Section 11 (e), a plaintiff can
recover the difference between the amount paid for the securities (not to
exceed the public offering price) and (1) the value at the time of suit, (2) the
price at which plaintiff sold the securities prior to suit, or (3) the price at which
the security was sold after suit was brought but before judgment, so long as the
damages computed under this third alternative would be less than those based
on the difference between the price paid for the security (not to exceed the
offering price) and the value at the time suit was brought.7"
The burden of proving the absence of a causal connection lies with the
defendant, so loss causation does not need to be shown in order for the
72plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. However, to the extent the defendant
is able to establish loss causation, damages will not be recoverable under
Section 11.73 Therefore, if the defendant is able to show that the entire decline
in the stock price was due to external market forces, there will be no
damages.74
64 id.
65 Id.
66 Gold v. Morrice, et al., 2008 WL 467619 (C.D.Cal. 2008).
67 Id. at *2.
68 Id. at *3.
69 id.
70 Hazen, supra note 47, at § 7.3[8].
71 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2008).
72 Hazen, supra note 47, at § 7.3[8].
73 Id.
74 id.
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Another defense to a Section 11 claim is the due diligence defense.75
Defendants other than the issuer can avoid liability under Section 11 if they
can demonstrate that they conducted a reasonable investigation with regard to
the portions of the registration statement for which they were responsible.76
How much due diligence is necessary or appropriate, or what constitutes a
"reasonable investigation," depends on the specific facts and circumstances at
hand. 77 There is a different standard for non-expert defendants as compared to
expert defendants, as well as varying protocols for different parts of the
registration statement and whether the challenged portion of the registration
statement has been made in part or in whole on the authority of an expert. 8
For the portions of a registration statement that are not made "on the
authority of an expert," a non-expert defendant must show that he or she "had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe"
that the relevant part of the registration statement that became effective
contained no material misstatement or omission.79 Portions of a registration
statement that are not made "on the authority of an expert" include the
description of the registrant, its history, its structure, and its business.80
As for the sections of the registration statement that were made with
the assistance of an expert, a non-expert defendant will not be held liable for
such statements if such defendants show under the burden of proof that, at the
time the registration statement became effective, they had "no reasonable
ground to believe and did not believe" that a material misstatement or
omission existed. 81 The standard for determining reasonable investigation and
reasonable grounds for belief is "the standard of reasonableness.. .required of a
prudent man in the management of his own property.
' 82
75 Clarke, supra note 57.
76 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2008).
77 Clarke, supra note 57.
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A), (C) (2008).
'9 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (2008).
80 Clarke, supra note 57.
81 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(C) (2008); However, a non-expert defendant may remain
responsible for unaudited interim financial information. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
82 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (2008); The SEC in Rule 176 also provides a list of "relevant
circumstances" in which a person's conduct is considered to be reasonable under
section 11(c).
"The list includes the type of issuer, the security, the type of
person, the office held if the person is an officer, the presence or
absence of another relationship to the issuer if the person is a
director, reasonable reliance on officers, employees, or others,
the role of the underwriter, the type of underwriting arrangement,
and whether the person had any responsibility for a document
incorporated by reference into the registration statement." Clarke,
supra note 57.
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If a director or officer of an investment bank were to be sued on a
Section I I claim for a misrepresented CDO on their registration statement,
they would most likely be able to forgo liability with the due diligence
defense. Because the process of assessing risk ratings is an expensive and
highly complex one, it is in the interest of the business entity to rely on the
ratings produced by ratings agencies.83 Further, because the relevant portion
of the registration statement would be made "on the authority of an expert",
i.e. the ratings agency, the non-expert directors and officers would not be
liable as long as they had "no reasonable ground to believe and did not
believe" that a material misstatement or omission existed at the time the
registration statement became effective.
2. Section 12(a)(2)
Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act creates a private cause of action
against "any person who.. .offers or sells a security" by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which "includes an untrue statement of a material fact
or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.,
84
In order for a plaintiff to succeed in a Section 12(a)(2) claim, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that he has standing, and also show (1) an offer or sale of a
security, (2) by means of a prospectus or oral communication, (3) that includes
an untrue statement of material fact or an omission of a material fact that is
necessary to make the statement not misleading, and (4) that the plaintiff did
not know the statements were false or misleading at the time of the purchase.85
The standing requirement for Section 12(a)(2) is fulfilled by showing
that the plaintiff is a purchaser of the security at issue in the initial offering.
86
Much like Section 11, a Section 12(a)(2) plaintiff does not need to allege
reliance on the misrepresentation or omission and does not need to allege
scienter on the part of the seller.87 When determining whether a statement was
false or misleading, only information that was available to an investor at the
time of sale should be considered. 88 Furthermore, like Section 11, the plaintiff
does not need to prove causation between the sale and the material
misrepresentation or omission.89
The defenses available under Section 12(a)(2) are similar to Section
1 1 defenses. 90 If the defendant can show that (1) the plaintiff knew the truth of
83 Bianco, supra note 6, at 8.
84 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2008).
85 Id.
86 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1995).
87 Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1980); Hill
York Corp. v. America Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971).
88 Clarke, supra note 57.
89 See, e.g., Hill York v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d at 696.
90 Clarke, supra note 57.
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the misrepresented or omitted material fact, (2) the misrepresented or omitted
fact was not material, or (3) the statute of limitations had been exceeded, then
the defendant can escape liability. 9' The defendant can also establish
reasonable care and due diligence defenses by showing that the defendant did
not know and, through the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known
of the misrepresentation or omission of material fact.
92
The district court in the Southern District of New York In re
WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation and the SEC have concluded that a
defendant's burden to show "reasonable care" under Section 12(a)(2) is lower
than the defendant's burden to show a "reasonable investigation" under
Section 11.93 One explanation is because Section 12(a)(2) due diligence does
not make any distinction based upon expert statements and only requires the
defendant to show that she used reasonable care.
94
When a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a 12(a)(2) claim, the plaintiff
is entitled to rescissory damages, or damages if the plaintiff no longer owns
the security.95 Rescissory damages are calculated as the consideration paid for
the security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon upon tender of the security.
96
B. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Securities Exchange Act")
requires any corporation with more than 500 shareholders and a minimal level
of assets to become a reporting company that is required to enter the
"continuous disclosure system. 97 A reporting company is required to file
reports annually and quarterly that disclose details to inform securities
analysts, institutional investors, shareholders, and investment advisers, who in
turn keep the market informed, which adjusts the price of the security to reflect
this information.
98
1. Rule 10b-5
When a director, officer, or any other individual who has access to
confidential inside information, trades his shares in the company based on his
inside knowledge without disclosing his knowledge to the public, he may be
91 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2008).
92 Id.
93In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 663 (S.D.N.Y
2004); SEC Release Nos. 33-8591, 34-52056, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 at 44,770
(August 3, 2005).
94 WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
95 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2008).
96 Id.
97 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 204.
98 Id. at 205.
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liable for insider trading under Rule I Ob-5. 99 In order for a defendant to be
liable for insider trading, the following elements must be present: (1) a false or
misleading statement or omission; (2) the statement or omission must be
material; (3) scienter; (4) the plaintiff bringing the claim must have standing;
(5) there must be reliance by the plaintiff on the statement or omission and (6)
there must be transaction causation and loss causation. 100
In regard to a false or misleading statement or omission, a failure to
disclose is actionable when there is a duty to disclose, but the defendant fails
to do so.' 0 ' There is no system of continuous disclosure, so corporations are
entitled to keep silent, unless positive law creates a duty to disclose. 0 2 A fact
is considered to be material if "there is substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important" in making an investment decision. 
03
In order for a plaintiff to have standing, the plaintiff must either be a
purchaser or seller of securities.'0 4 For the showing of reliance element, the
Supreme Court approved the "fraud on the market" doctrine, which states that
a securities fraud plaintiff can satisfy the requirement by claiming that he
relied on the integrity of the market price that allegedly reflected the false or
misleading information rather than relying directly on the allegedly false or
misleading statements at issue.'0 5 Furthermore, a plaintiff must show both
transaction causation and loss causation.'0 6 Transaction causation requires a
plaintiff to show that the violations at issue caused the plaintiff to engage in
the transaction.'0 7 Because a showing of transaction causation depends on a
determination that the plaintiff relied on the violation, it is closely intertwined
with the reliance element.10 8 Loss causation involves a determination that the
harm suffered by the investor "flowed" from the misstatement. 09
An example of a plaintiff who failed to establish causation for a lOb-5
claim can be found in the shareholder derivative action brought against
Countrywide Financial. 0 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants made
sales at inflated prices because of a "host of associated false and misleading
99 Clarke, supra note 57.
100 Id.
101 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
102 Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001).
103 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
104 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
105 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); A defense to the showing of
reliance can be made by demonstrating that a plaintiff's decision to purchase or sell
shares was not influenced by the alleged misstatements or that the
misrepresentations did not distort the price of the stock. Clarke, supra note 57.1o6 Id.
107 Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (1Ith Cir. 1997).
'08 AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst and Young, 206 F.3d 202, 209 (2d Cir. 2000).
109 See, e.g., Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-81 (2d Cir.
1974).
10 In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Derivative Litigation, 554 F. Supp.2d. 1044,
1054-55 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
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statements" that deceived investors as to "the true financial condition of
Countrywide and the nature of the loans that were being originated by
Countrywide."'' However, the court denied the plaintiffs' allegations on
insider trading because the plaintiffs failed to show the connection between the
insider sales and the repurchase." 12 Furthermore, they failed to tie the
suspicious insider sales to the timing of the repurchase with any precision or
detail.' '3
Unlike Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2), there is no due diligence
defense for a 1 Ob-5 claim. "4 However, a defendant may be able to preclude a
finding of scienter by satisfying a due diligence or reasonable care defense
under Section 11 or 12(a)(2)." 5
C. Duty of Care
Although most of the current suits filed against lenders involve the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act, some also allege a breach of
fiduciary duty. Every director and officer in the United States owes a duty of
care and duty of loyalty to his or her company. 116 The duty of care is a
principle that derives from the law of agency, and requires the agent to
perform his duties with care, skill, and prudence of "like persons in a like
position."' 17 Although the duty of care itself seems straight forward, its
enforcement has been more complicated.1 8 Most cases that have imposed
liability on a director or officer involve instances in which corporate officials
were suspiciously inattentive to an impending disaster or had a hidden conflict
of interest explaining his careless behavior." 
9
The suit against Countrywide Financial included a duty of care claim,
alleging that Countrywide "exacerbated the risky nature" of subprime loans
"by offering them to borrowers without requiring them to document their
income."'120  By approving and offering loans without knowing the
creditworthiness of its borrowers, the plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide could
"not reasonably know how likely it was that deferred interest on pay option
ARMs would ultimately be repaid."' 2' Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that
1" Id. at 1054.
112Id. at 1067.
1"Id. at 1067-68.
114 Clarke, supra note 57.
115 See In re International Rectifier Sec. Litig., 1997 WL 529600, *12 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 31, 1997).
116 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 150.
1178id.
''8 Id.
"9 Id. at 151.
i21In re Countrywide, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-1055.
121 Id.
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in practice, the origination of riskier subprime loans often violated the
company's own underwriting policies. 
122
The duty of care is scrutinized under a gross negligence standard
under Delaware case law, and the law presumes that the directors acted
honestly and in good faith. 123 The acts of the directors and officers are
assessed using a balancing legal doctrine known as the business judgment
rule. 124 The business judgment rule shields directors and officers from liability
for decisions that in hindsight were bad for the company. 125 The rule exists
because it is generally in the shareholders' interest for the directors to accept
some reasonable risks, and courts do not have the ability to assess the risks in a
meaningful way.126
However, for the directors and officers to enjoy the business judgment
rule, they must show that they made an informed decision.127 Directors and
officers can prove that they made an informed decision by creating a paper
record or paper trail evidencing consultation with experts or other
documentation that would show that they made a well-advised, well-
deliberated decision. 128 If the directors cannot show that their decision was
informed, they can also escape liability by sustaining the burden of proving the
"entire fairness" of the transaction they approved. 29 In order to prove the
entire fairness of a transaction, the directors must demonstrate fair price and
fair dealing of a transaction. 130
In the event that a claim related to the subprime mortgage crisis is
brought against a director or officer under the duty of care, the defendants will
probably not be able to assert the business judgment rule. A plaintiff could
bring a claim under the duty of care, and assert that officials were suspiciously
inattentive to an impending disaster by alleging that the defendants (1) must
have known that the housing market was not keeping up, (2) that borrowers
were not able to pay their loans when the interest rates reset, and (3) that many
homes were foreclosing. The directors and officers would most likely not be
able to assert the business judgment rule because an expert would know of the
impending disaster, even if he did not know it would be so detrimental.
However, because Delaware General Corporation Law § 102(b)(7)
authorizes shareholders to adopt charter provisions under which directors will
be liable only for conduct that involves illegality, a breach of the duty of
122 Id.
123 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 151. The law of Delaware is important for
corporations because the majority of large corporations with publicly traded shares
are incorporated in Delaware. Id. at 145.
124Id. at 152.
125 id.
121 Id. at 151-152.
127 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
128 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 153.
129 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
130 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 151.
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loyalty, or intentional misconduct, and not duty of care, directors and officers
may still be able to escape liability if they incorporated this provision in their
charter.'31 Other states have adopted similar statutes or have redefined the
duty of care, making it either a wholly subjective standard, only requiring that
the director or officer acted in good faith, or specifying that a director or
officer will be liable only if his conduct constitutes willful misconduct or
recklessness. 132 Therefore, even if a director or officer could potentially be
liable for a violation of the duty of care, they could easily avoid liability.
D. Duty to Monitor
Within the duty of care is the duty to monitor.133 Under the duty to
monitor, a director must understand business, keep herself informed of
operations of the company, be familiar with the company's financial status,
and inquire into "red flags."' 134 Once a director finds a "red flag," she is then
under the duty to investigate the matter.1
35
In the suit against Countrywide Financial, the plaintiffs alleged that a
number of committees within Countrywide failed to fulfill their duties to
monitor. 136 The plaintiffs also identified a number of "red flags" that would
have provided warning to directors and officers to inquire further. 137 These
include:
(1) the shift to riskier loan products; (2) the rising
delinquencies in pay-option ARMs and home equity lines of
credit ("HELOCs"); (3) sharply rising rates of negative
amortization and associated 'phantom earnings'; (4) the
'dramatic increase in retained interests held on Countrywide's
balance sheet'; (5) the fact that the Company's valuation of
MSRs, retained interests and loans held for sale 'fluctuated
wildly without any basis'; (6) the pitfalls of other mortgage
lenders; and (7) industry publications about nontraditional
131 Id; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).
132 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 153-154.
131Id. at 154.
134 Id.
135 See In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959
(1996) (requires a duty to establish a legal compliance program).
136 In re Countrywide, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1052. This includes the Audit and Ethics
Committee, responsible for overseeing the integrity of financial statements and
reports and monitoring the Company's exposure to risk; the Credit Committee
responsible for overseeing credit objectives and policies, including the review of
the Company's credit exposures and loan loss allowances; and the Operations and
Public Policy Committee, responsible for overseeing "operational risk" and other
matters relating to responsible lending. Id.
137 Id. at 1054-1055.
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loans, including those that were critical of low-documentation
pay option ARMs. 1
3 8
The court in the Countrywide Financial case denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss because the plaintiff showed a strong inference of at least
deliberate recklessness for the failure to monitor claims. 39 Although these are
examples given by the plaintiffs in the suit against Countrywide Financial,
many, if not most, would apply to other lenders as well.
E. Duty of Loyalty
The duty of loyalty also derives from the law of agency, and imposes
an obligation on directors and officers to give their company the utmost
loyalty in conducting business. 140 The most common violation of the duty of
loyalty is a dealing in which a director or officer conducts a transaction for the
benefit of herself. 141 In self-dealing transactions, the burden of proving the
fairness of the transaction lies with the director. 142 However, the director will
not be liable if the transaction was (1) approved by disinterested directors after
full disclosure of the conflict, (2) approved by shareholders after similar
disclosure, or (3) approved by the court as fair. 
43
The duty of loyalty also requires that an officer turn any opportunities
over to the corporation that were offered for consideration to the corporation,
or offered in such a context.' 44 The officer may take the opportunity for
herself only if she first offers it to the corporation with full disclosure and the
corporation rejects. 14  The test to determine whether an opportunity is a
corporate opportunity is how closely related the opportunity is to an existing
line of business in which the corporation is engaged. 1
46
A recent shareholder derivative suit filed against Merrill Lynch
contains a potential duty of loyalty example.147 Plaintiffs claim that Merrill
exerted substantial control over Ownit, a subprime mortgage originator, to
feed its CDO machine so it could then encourage and finance loans to
138 Id.
13 9 Id. at 1077.
140 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 164-165.
141 Id. at 165.
142 id.
143 Revised Model Business Corporation Act § 8.31; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 144
(2008).
144 KLEIN, supra note 43, at 167.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Plaintiffs' Consolidated Opposition to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the
Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 14, In re Merrill Lynch and Co.,
Inc. Securities, Derivative and ERISA Litigation, 2008 WL 4342446 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (No. 07CV9633).
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subprime borrowers. 141 In late 2005, Merrill purchased a 20% interest in
Ownit and extended Ownit a $3.5 billion line of credit, and then two-thirds of
Ownit's mortgage originations were sold to Merrill. 149 In early 2006, Jonathan
Blum, a Merrill Managing Director and the company's designated
representative on Ownit's board, instructed Bill Dallas, the President of Ownit,
to reduce Ownit's underwriting standards so it could issue more subprime
mortgages.150 This would give Merrill even more product for its CDO
machine. 151 Despite Dallas' objection to the proposal, Ownit lowered the
standards. 152 As a direct result of this action, Ownit declared bankruptcy in
December of 2006. 153
This scenario presents a potential violation of the duty of loyalty
because Merrill had acquired enough of an interest in Ownit to exercise
control over the company, then instituted policies that would benefit Merrill to
the detriment of Ownit. The detriment is obvious after the fact because the
company declared bankruptcy after lowering its underwriting standards as
instructed by Merrill. However, if the decision was approved by disinterested
directors after full disclosure of the conflict, or if the decision was approved by
shareholders after similar disclosure, then the directors and officers of Merrill
will not be found in violation of their duty of loyalty.
IV. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS INSURANCE COVERAGE AND
EXCLUSIONS
At one time, lawsuits against directors and officers were a rarity and
corporations were not permitted to indemnify their directors and officers for
loss because the expense was not viewed as a benefit to the shareholders.
154
However, due to a major increase in the number of suits filed against directors
and officers, a need for corporations to obtain liability insurance and states to
adopt legislation permitting corporations to indemnify officials arose.
155
Corporations obtained D&O insurance so that the top candidates for office
would not be discouraged to take the position because of the threat of
litigation. 156 The costs that are covered and the method of coverage vary
depending on the language of the policy itself, and the courts have continually
focused their analysis on the language in the policy.
148 id.
14 9 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Lee R. Russ and Thomas F. Segalla, Risks and Activities Covered by Insurance
Policy, in 9A COUCH ON INSURANCE § 131:30 (3d ed. Thomson Reuters/West,
2008).
155 Id.
156 Id.
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A typical clause for D&O insurance provides for 95% coverage of all
"loss" (a defined term) for which the insured are "legally obligated" to pay for
claims that are made against them for "wrongful acts" (a defined term) in their
capacities as directors and officers, subject to the retention amounts and
monetary limits on liability applicable to the policy period.'57 D&O insurance
policies are generally "claims-made" policies, meaning that in order for a
policy to be triggered, the claim or claims must be brought against an insured
director or officer during the period covered by the policy. 15 8 Further, D&O
policies typically provide coverage only to individual directors and officers of
the insured company, and indirect coverage to corporations that have
indemnified their directors and officers for loss in connection with claims
made against them. 15 9
A D&O policy is designed to cover directors and officers with an
endorsement protecting the corporation, and is not an expanded
comprehensive liability policy that covers a corporation against liability for
everything that it does. 160 Therefore, if a claim is not made against a director
or officer, a D&O policy cannot be triggered. 161 Covered directors and
officers must be "duly elected" or "duly appointed," which the courts have
interpreted as meaning that the individual became a director or officer through
the regular and proper channels ordinarily followed by the corporation in its
hiring, appointment, or election process.162
Furthermore, policies often require that "the insured director or officer
engaged in the wrongful conduct while acting in his or her capacity as a
director or officer of the insuring corporation, often 'solely' in that
capacity."1 63 Thus, it has been held that directors and officers who served
more than one company, who served also as an attorney for the company, or
who acted as a shareholder of the company, were not insured where their
wrongful acts were committed while they acted in the capacity of the positions
they had with other organizations or outside their scope as director or officer
157 Joseph Warren Bishop II, Chapter 8: Directors' and Officers'Liability
Insurance, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: INDEMNIFICATION AND
INSURANCE, February 2008, at § 8:6.
158 David J. Marchitelli, Annotation, Construction and Application of Directors and
Officers Insurance Policy, Exclusive of Exclusion and Notice of Claim Provisions,
22 A.L.R. 6TH 113 § 2 (2007); This means that the actual loss and wrongful acts
that form the basis of liability do not have to occur within the policy period. Id.
159 Russ & Segalla, supra note 154.
160 Bishop, supra note 157.
161 This is assuming that the policy does not include Side C entity coverage. Id.
162 Marchitelli, supra note 158, at §4; The court in Sphinx Intern., Inc. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., applying Florida law, held that although it
was shown that the former director had obtained his position by fraudulent means,
because he was a "duly elected" or "duly appointed" director, he was therefore an
"insured" under the coverage provisions of the policy. 412 F.3d 1224 (1 1th Cir.
2005).
163 Marchitelli, supra note 158.
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of the insured company. 64 In order for an insurer to establish that an insured
did not act solely in their capacity as director or officer, and therefore deny
coverage, the insurer must not merely rely on allegations made in the
underlying complaint, but must offer evidence sufficient to invoke the
contractual limitation. 65 Most policies also offer coverage for past and future
directors and officers as third party beneficiaries of the contracts with the right
to seek enforcement of the provisions and policies under the policy definition
of "insured."'
166
A "wrongful act" includes director and officer errors and breaches of
duty, but does not include willful or intentional misconduct or injunctive relief
or claims sounding in contract. 167 A policy may define a "wrongful act" to be
"any actual or alleged error or misstatement or misleading statement or act or
omission or neglect or breach of duty by the directors and officers in the
discharge of their duties, individually or collectively, or any matter claimed
against them solely by reason of their being directors and officers.' 68 The
breaches of fiduciary duty include the duty of care, duty to monitor, and duty
of loyalty.
"Loss" is defined as "the amount the directors and officers are legally
obligated to pay."' 169 To be considered a "loss," the company must suffer a
financial detriment.170  This includes damages, judgments, settlements,
'64 Id. at §5; In Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Irwin Co., the Ohio Court of Appeals held
that where the directors and officers had not sought authorization from the
company for a stock buyback and profited from the transaction, the purchase and
sale of the stock was made in their personal capacities, rather than in their
capacities as directors and officers, and so they were not covered for losses in
connection with an underlying shareholder suit. 2000 WL 1867297 (Ohio Ct. App.
I st Dist. Hamilton County 2000).
165 Marchitelli, supra note 158, at §6.
166 Id. at §7.
167 Olympic Club v. Those Interested Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 991 F.2d
497 (9th Cir. 1993).
168 Bishop, supra note 157.
169 Id.
170 Id.; Although some policies limit coverage to claims for monetary damages and
does not cover claims that only seek equitable relief,
insured were entitled to coverage in connection with underlying
suits that included damage claims, or could have resulted in
damage awards, so where shareholders who sought equitable
relief also included a claim for damages in the form of attorney's
fees, and where the underlying claimants reserved the right to
reinstate a damage claim that had been instituted and later
withdrawn, courts have held that the cases involved covered
'loss' that required the insurers to provided coverage for defense
costs and any resulting monetary damages.
Marchitelli, supra note 155, at §41.
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attorney's fees, and other costs incurred in the defense of legal actions.'
7
'
"Loss" does not include fines, penalties, exemplary or punitive damages, or a
court's order to return stolen property, or any other "ill-gotten gain.' 7 2
Because there must be financial detriment in order for there to be a loss, if an
officer cannot suffer a loss based upon statutory immunity, there is no
coverage for an insured.
1 73
An insurer is only required to cover for losses that are outlined in the
policy, and the courts have generally taken the position that whether the duty
to defend has been triggered depends on the character of the underlying
complaint and the claims alleged therein. 174 It is the insured's burden to show
that the underlying complaint and claims alleged fall within the coverage
provisions of the policy. 175 After the insured has fulfilled his burden, the
burden then shifts to the insurer to establish that an exclusion applies to defeat
coverage if possible. 176 However, in practice, an insurer may have a duty to
defend even if the underlying complaint and alleged claims involve acts that
are usually not covered by the policy. 177 An example of this is a complaint
that alleges a number of wrongful acts, including some that could be
intentional acts usually not covered by the policy. Despite the fact that the
allegations in the complaint were couched in terms of intentional acts, the
court cannot speculate as to the merit of the characterizations, and if the facts
alleged show any basis for imposing liability that is within the policy coverage,
the insurer has a duty to defend. 1
78
Many courts have taken the position that D&O insurance policies are
contracts of liability, meaning that an insurer must provide coverage in
payment of covered loss as the loss is incurred. 79 This is often an issue with
regards to defense costs that can be a daunting amount in director and officer
litigation. 180 The courts have come to this conclusion because of the reference
171 Bishop, supra note 157.
172 Level 3 Communications, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2001).
173 Bishop, supra note 157.
174 Marchitelli, supra note 158, at §§ 19,20.
'
75 Id. at § 20.
176 Id.
171Id. at§ 19.
178 See Lime Tree Village Community Club Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm General Ins.
Co., 980 F.2d 1402 (1 1th Cir. 1993).
179 Marchitelli, supra note 158, at § 2.
180 2008: The Year in Review, INSIGHTS (OakBridge, Beechwood, OH),
January/February 2009, at 5; Many corporations have been finding themselves
confronting an unexpected new challenge with the increased likelihood that defense
costs alone may exhaust the entire amount of available D&O insurance coverage.
For example, Collins & Aikman bankruptcy and related criminal proceeding
accumulated defense expense exhausted the company's entire $50 million limit in
D&O insurance before the criminal case went to trial. Id. However, an insurer
may be obligated to continue to pay defense costs where a policy is ambiguous as
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to D&O insurance policies as "liability" policies, that the policy often states
that the insurer would "pay on behalf of' the insured directors and officers,
and that the policy described "loss" as any amount that the insured directors
and officers are "legally obligated to pay."' 8 1 Other courts have taken the
view that contemporaneous defense costs are not required to be paid by the
insurer when the language of the policy is silent as to the timing of payment
and when the amount of the covered loss cannot be determined without the
resolution of factual issues.' 82
The insurer's duty to provide coverage for defense costs only applies
to claims and parties that were covered by the policies. 183 Furthermore, the
courts have concluded that the payment of such costs can be made subject to
apportionment between covered and uncovered claims and parties.
184
Apportionment can be postponed until it can be determined which claims are
covered and which ones are not. 185 The courtjustified apportionment in Gon
v. First State Ins. Co., by reasoning that a third party complainant, who may
overstate its claims against an insured, should not be arbiter of the policy's
coverage and apportioning legal expenses where coverage is not yet clear
because the facts have not been fully developed and risks depriving the insured
of the benefits of the protection that they purchased. 1
86
In addition, even though the default rule may state that defense costs
must be paid contemporaneously, an insurer can waive such an obligation in
the contract itself.187 Under California law, a liability insurer usually has to
pay defense costs contemporaneously, but this rule has not applied where the
language of the policy at issue "did not provide for a duty to defend or a duty
to pay all defense costs as they were incurred, but rather allowed the insurer
the option to advance defense costs relating to claims that the insurer believed
to involve persons insured under the policy and loss covered by the policy."' 88
Much like the California court that honored the insurer's ability to
contract out of the default of contemporaneous defense cost payment, the
insurer can contract out of and exclude certain coverage from its policies in
other areas as well. Although not all policies include the same exclusions,
below is a list of common provisions that exclude D&O insurance coverage.
to whether defense costs were to be included in the calculation of the policy limits.
Marchitelli, supra note 158, at § 45.S1 Id. at § 23.
182 Id. at § 28.
183 Id. at § 24.
841id.
185 Id.
186 Gon v. First State Inc. Co., 871 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1989).
187 Marchitelli, supra note 158, at § 29.
188 Id. citing Commercial Capital Bankcorp. Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 419
F. Supp. 2d 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
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A. Securities Claim Exclusion
Some D&O policies have an express securities claim exclusion. The
common definition of a "securities claim" is a claim alleging a violation of the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, any similar state
statute or similar common law, or any rules or regulations promulgated
thereunder. 189
The securities claim exclusion has been applied in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which held that there was no coverage
under a D&O policy for claims made against a financial services company and
a number of its directors and officers for alleged wrongful acts in connection
with the company's underwriting and sale of certain municipal bonds because
the company's D&O policy included the exclusion.19° The opinion
demonstrates that an insurance policy negotiated between sophisticated parties
must be interpreted strictly according to their terms, despite what the common
understanding may be about the meaning or operation of policy provisions. 191
Because most of the directors and officers litigation arising from the
subprime mortgage crisis involves Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2) claims
from the Securities Act and Rule I Ob-5 claims from the Securities Exchange
Act, the inclusion of the securities claim exclusion in a D&O policy will be
lethal. Not only will directors and officers not be able to recover for
judgments against them, but they will have to reimburse any defense costs that
were paid on their behalf to litigate the cases.
B. Dishonesty Exclusion
A typical dishonesty exclusion in a D&O policy states:
[T]he company shall not be liable to make any payment for
loss in connection with any claims made against any of the
insured persons brought about or contributed to by the
dishonesty of such insured person if ajudgment or other final
adjudication adverse to such insured person establishes that
acts of active and deliberate dishonesty or committing or
attempting by such insured person with actual dishonest
purpose and intent and were material to the cause of action so
adjudicated.' 92
189 Mark E. Miller, All D&O Policies Are Not Created Equally, GT ALERT
(Greenberg Traurig, Washington D.C.), August 2002, at 3-4.
190 In re SRC Holding Corp, 545 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2008).
'9' The D&O Diary, supra note 38, Nov. 30, 2008.
192 Wildermuth, supra note 11.
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In order for a director or officer to be personally liable, the director or officer
must have had a purpose and intent that were material to the cause of action.
1 93
In other words, the loss must be "contributed to" by the dishonest acts of the
director or officer. 194
Some courts require a final adjudication before coverage is denied. 95
However, others do not require final adjudication, but only a requirement that
the conduct occurred and that the insurer denies coverage in good faith. 1
96
Although it does not appear the subprime losses are a product of
affirmative dishonest behavior of the directors and officers, there is still the
issue of whether the marketers of the securities concealing information about
the risk at the outset or the adverse development materializing constitutes
dishonesty as the term is used in the standard D&O policy exclusion. 9
Further, depending on how the complainants present the facts and how courts
interpret them, directors and officers may become personally liable for
superficially lowering the risk of subprime loans to investors through CDOs
and artificial ratings, but only if they had the purpose and intent to be
dishonest.
In reality, it is very difficult to prove an allegation of fraud because
there is a requirement to show the defendant had intent to deceive.' 98 Proving
this element beyond a reasonable doubt can be difficult, and although sloppy
risk management is lamentable, it is not illegal.199 To combat this problem,
many attorneys have come to rely on e-mail as evidence of intent.200 Because
people often forget or disregard how easily messages can be retrieved, and
because there is a conversational aspect of e-mail that disillusions individuals
to think they are having a casual conversation, indicia of fraudulent intent can
often be found in e-mail.20'
Other difficulties arise in showing that executives deliberately
overvalued complex mortgage securities.20 2 To avoid liability, executives can
easily point to the continuing debate over mark-to-market rules, which
standards regulators recently relaxed.20 3 Some have said that defendants will
193 Id.
194 Gerber, Roberto, & Appler, supra note 7.
195 Wildermuth, supra note 11; See also PepsiCo, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 640
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likely state that they were acting in good faith, based on a faulty understanding
of the market, in which they would lack fraudulent intent.2 °4
C. Personal Profits Exclusion
Most D&O policies have a personal profits exclusion that excludes
coverage for losses that arise out of, or are attributable to, the insured directors
and officers who obtain any personal profit or advantage to which he or she is
not legally entitled.0 5 In such claims, the insurance company must prove that
the wrongful conduct actually occurred before coverage can be denied.20 6
Although it is not known whether a director or officer can be personally liable
for the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis under this method, it is
plausible, considering the fact that between 2001 and 2005, subprime
mortgage originations grew from $173 billion to $665 billion, meaning that
most likely, directors and officers benefited from this dramatic increase. 0 7
A concrete example of a situation in which the personal profits
exclusion may apply is Barclays Bank's complaint filed against Bear
Stearns.20 8 The complaint alleges that Bear Steams manipulated the fund at
issue to insulate itself from harsh losses and also used multiple entities in the
transaction chain to generate additional fees charged to Barclays or against the
fund principal. 20 9 Barclays also alleged that Bear Steams and its management
entity operated the fund deceptively, for their own or their conspirators' gain,
in bad faith, and in a grossly negligent manner, contrary to the duties that they
owed to Barclays. 21 0  Furthermore, while the value of the fund was
plummeting in February and March 2007, Barclays alleges that Bear Steams
Senior Manager Ralph Cioffi withdrew millions of dollars of his own money
from the enhanced fund, while publicly making optimistic forecasts about the
211portfolio's prospects.
Although it is not certain that the personal profits exclusion will apply,
looking at the complaint clearly raises the potential for Bear Steams and its
directors and officers to face personal liability for reimbursing its insurer for
any defense costs advanced, and having to pay any damages out-of-pocket.212
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D. Insured versus Insured Exclusion
The "insured versus insured" exclusion precludes coverage for claims
by, or on behalf of, the insured corporation, its affiliates or directors and
officers against other insured persons from the same corporation.2 13 Most
policies do not exclude shareholder derivative suits, even though they are
technically brought in the name of the insured corporation, but this language
must be expressly stated in the policy. 214 For claims to be covered, they must
be "instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the
solicitation of, assistance of, active participation of, or intervention of' any
insured person.El 5
The insured versus insured exclusion may arise if an insolvent
company continues business as a debtor-in-possession or has its activities
taken over by a receiver. 1 6 During the savings and loans crisis in the late
1980s and early 1990s, several hundred failed institutions were placed in
receivership with what is now known as the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC"). 217 The FDIC equivalent liquidated the assets of the
institutions, distributed the proceeds to creditors, and often filed civil lawsuits
against directors and officers it believed had "mismanaged" the receivership
218
estate s. Insurers then invoked the insured versus insured exclusion, claiming
that suits by receivers against directors and officers were the same as suits
within the same covered entity. El9 However, the court concluded that the
policy of the insured versus insured exclusion was to prevent collusive suits,
and because the FDIC was genuinely an adverse party to the directors and
officers of the receivership estate, the exclusion should not apply.
220
Furthermore, the FDIC did not strictly "step into the shoes" of the failed
institution because it could bring suit both as the institution's successor and as
its creditor, as well as on behalf of the institution's creditors and shareholders,
221
and as subrogee to the depositor's rights against the institution.
This means that if suit is brought by the FDIC for failed lending
institutions was a result of the subprime mortgage crisis, insurers will most
likely not be able to claim the insured versus insured exclusion to preclude
coverage of directors and officers. However, if the insurer is able to show that
the FDIC did in fact "step into the shoes" of the institution, the insurer may be
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able to claim the exclusion. 222 This is so because any recovery by the FDIC
would not be to the benefit of the failed institution's depositors, creditors, or
shareholders, but solely to the FDIC itself.
223
E. Regulatory Exclusion
The regulatory exclusion applies to any claims brought by a regulatory
agency against a director or officer, including claims brought by regulatory
agencies after they take possession of an insolvent lending institution.22 4 This
situation often arises when the business in question is a bank, because
government agencies commonly bring suit against the individual directors and
officers.225
For example, when a state or federal depository institution in the
banking industry fails or struggles, the FDIC may be appointed as conservator
or receiver. 226 Although there is a public policy argument that the regulatory
exclusion impairs the ability of the government to seek redress in situations
involving a failed bank, courts have determined that the parties' freedom to
227
contract for the language of a D&O policy overrides the policy argument.
However, if the wording of the exclusion is ambiguous, the insured may be
able to argue that the regulatory exclusion should not apply. 228
The regulatory exclusion would also apply to SEC civil actions.229
Therefore, even if a D&O policy does not include a securities claim exclusion,
the insurer may be able to exclude coverage through the regulatory exclusion
for Section 11, Section 12(a)(2), and Rule IOb-5 claims if the plaintiff is the
SEC. Because the bulk of the subprime mortgage-related suits involve these
types of claims, this exclusion can prove to be important for directors and
officers.
F. Rescission by Insurer
Rescission by the insurer is a common method used by the insurer to
avoid coverage under a D&O policy when no other exclusion is applicable. To
succeed, the insurer must establish that the statements or misrepresentations
made or omitted by the company in the application were (1) material and false
at the time, and (2) actually contributed to the increased loss under the
222 Id.
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224 D& O Liability Policies-Regulatory Exclusion, CLIENT ALERT (Latham &
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policy.230 Succeeding on a rescission claim can be tricky because of the nature
of the marketplace in which changes occur on a daily basis that may impact a
stock's value and the corporation's bottom line. 3
A misrepresentation is considered to be material if it diminishes an
insurer's opportunity to evaluate or estimate risk.232 The test applied by the
courts is whether reasonable insurers would regard the fact as one that
substantially increases the chance that the risk insured against will happen and,
therefore, would reject the application.233
Common law creates a duty of disclosure by the insured in connection
with the purchase of insurance. 234 The duty arises either out of the fiduciary
nature of the insurance relationship or from the equitable principle that in all
express contracts, there is an implied warranty that neither party will make
material misrepresentations to the other concerning the subject matter of the
contract.235
In practice, if the insurer did not ask for information in the insurance
application or otherwise, such information is determined to be immaterial.236
This also implies that if an insurer specifically asks for information on the
application, the matter is deemed to be material.237 When an insurer seeks to
rescind a policy based on the insured's failure to disclose information that was
not required on the application form, the insurer must prove that the
concealment was both material and fraudulent. 238 If there is ambiguity
whether particular information was asked on the application, the ambiguity is
resolved in favor of the insured, and an insurer is presumed, in its specific
questions, to have requested all of the information that it believed to be
material.239
During a rescission procedure, the insurer must continue to make
contemporaneous payments for defense costs if it is required to do so under the
policy, until the issue of rescission has been adjudicated. 240 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York has rejected the argument
made by an insurer that its obligation to advance defense costs ended when it
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gave notice to the insured that the policy was void, and that the insured had the
burden to show that the insurer's rescission argument would fail.
241
Therefore, if a D&O insurer asked about an insured's MBS, and the
insured either misrepresented or omitted the risky pieces, the insurer could
have a claim for rescission of the policy. Further, if an insurer asked about the
financial status of the insured company, and the insured either misrepresented
or omitted risky subprime mortgages from their account balances, the insurer
could also rescind its coverage and directors and officers could become
personally liable.
V. CONCLUSION
Although D&O insurance is bought to protect directors and officers
from incurring personal liability, there are many exclusions that could apply in
lawsuits relating to the subprime mortgage crisis. Because courts will honor
the language of the D&O policy at issue, if the policy clearly outlines an
exclusion, that exclusion will be followed.
Of course, some claims in which directors and officers could
potentially be liable, such as the failure to fulfill the duty to monitor and
violation of the duty of loyalty, may fall under coverage of D&O insurance, in
which case there would be no personal liability unless the amount in damages
exceeds the amount covered by the policy. However, considering most of the
present subprime mortgage-related suits involve violations of the Securities
Act of 1933 or violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, if a D&O
policy contains a securities claim exclusion, the director or officer likely will
incur a detrimental amount in personal damages. On a similar note, if a D&O
policy contains a regulatory exclusion and the SEC is a party to the lawsuit, a
director or officer will become personally liable for the damages and defense
costs in this way, as well. A director or officer may also incur personal
liability if the D&O policy includes a dishonesty exclusion, personal profits
exclusion, or insured versus insured exclusion. Further, if there is no
exclusion applicable, an insurer may try to rescind the policy by claiming that
there was a material misrepresentation or omission in the insurance
application.
Therefore, ifa director or officer wants to avoid personal liability in a
subprime mortgage crisis suit, they must meticulously go over the provisions
of their D&O policy to ensure that undesirable exclusions are not contained
within. They should also take care to complete due diligence and consult
experts when necessary. Unfortunately, for many of the subprime mortgage
lenders, this advice comes far too late, and it will be newsworthy to see how
much damage directors and officers will actually incur as the judgments come
out.
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